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ABSTRACT 
 
The Portsmouth Block Mills’ operations are assessed using archival materials showing staff 
numbers, hours and work assignments, providing insight into scheduling and workload 
management, capacity availability and use, and overall facility organization and design. A 
review of production records reveals items made specifically to meet individual production 
requirements and those made for “stock” and later use, and the Mill’s internal lines ran in a 
relatively“lean” fashion. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Portsmouth Block Mill was built in 1803 to produce blocks (pulleys) for the Royal 
Navy. It was implemented as part of Samuel Bentham’s reforms in the Royal Navy’s operations 
with machinery designed by Marc Isambard Brunel and built by Henry Maudslay. Cooper (1981-
2, 1984) described it as a production line and her analysis can be extended using newly found 
data on the Mill’s production (Anon., 1809C) and operations (Burr, 1812; Anon., 1809B). These 
show the Mill was well designed and managed. A better understanding of the Mill’s management 
and its operations will have popular appeal as well as academic interest.  The Mill’s operations 
may reveal historic management techniques that were more widely used. 
 
Historical Context 
 
The Mill reflected contemporary management understanding applying the idea of tightly 
linked production processes to producing discrete units in a batch production mode. The 
mechanization of these processes was innovative, requiring new working methods and 
management of inter-related processes. The factory was making a simple product in large 
numbers of small batches of standardized, though somewhat different designs and sizes. These 
features simplified the factory’s management. However, the Mill’s management may not reflect 
wide-spread thinking or practice. Coats (2006, p. 59) observes that Bentham sought to “…enable 
best [emphasis added] practice from public and private enterprise to drive reform and 
innovation….” Cooper (1981-2) observes that although British factories did not directly emulate 
the Mill its indirect influence was substantial through the three principals. Notwithstanding these 
reservations, the Mill’s management practices would have been more widely useful. During the 
Mill’s first years its capacity was insufficient to meet demand, thereby revealing management’s 
efforts to bring in equipment and obtain materials to function most effectively. 
  
New Data 
 
The volume and detailed archival records reflect the conflicts surrounding the Mill. Coats 
(2006, p. 63) observes that the Mill was introduced at a time “…while these [Management] 
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Boards were barely speaking to one another. Perhaps because relations were so bad, 
correspondence is remarkably detailed… as if all sides realised they might at some future point 
have to justify every action to a commission.” Furthermore, records are unusually detailed since 
the payments for Brunel were to be based on cost savings vis-à-vis older production methods. 
Additional weekly labour reports (Burr, 1812) identify individual workers, their work 
assignments to named processes making specific block components; the time individual workers 
worked in days, fractional days and hours, their weekly pay and its breakdown in quantities 
(usually hundreds or dozens, or fractions thereof) of components made at given piece rates. 
These provide information about shop-floor organisation, work rates and output, and allow 
inferences about the Mill’s operations. In addition, Anon. (1808, 1809B) show work-in-progress 
inventories that allow inferences to be drawn about inventory management, production batch 
sizes and processing policies.  
 
Actual Production and Theoretical Demand  
 
Although the Mill could manufacture all the blocks that the Navy required, Coats (2005) 
and Gilbert (1965, p. 1) say that was 100,000 per year, though Gilbert (1965) also claims the 
maximum output was 130,000. Morriss (2011, p. 181) claims that 150,000 were made annually 
during the Crimean War. Production records have been found (Anon, 15/Sept/1809C) that detail 
the types and numbers of blocks made. The Mill produced 130,475 blocks in 1808, with 125,228 
completely made on Brunel’s machines and 5,247 oversized blocks that likely had some 
machine-made components, with another 10,321 “deadeyes”, machine-made in most sizes; for a 
total output of 140,796 blocks in 1808.  
The Mill was claimed to be capable of fully satisfying the Navy’s demand, but having 
these figures does not fully resolve whether it was able to do so. The case that the Mill could 
satisfy demand fully will be strengthened by providing an independent estimate of demand. In 
this unusual case the theoretical demand can be estimated since the Navy was the only customer 
and it used blocks for clear purposes linked to the numbers of its ships. The concept of dependent 
demand (Jacobs and Chase, 2013) can be used, then giving estimates of the blocks used each 
year: an overall total estimated as 800,000 blocks; with about 750,000 of the types manufactured 
by the Mill. Unsupported estimates that the Navy used one million blocks are repeated (Cooper, 
1981-2); this provides a foundation for that. An estimate (1/6 of the 800,000 blocks in active 
service) of replacement requirements yields an annual demand for 125,000 blocks, roughly 
matching the number made in 1808.  
 
Machine Loading and Coordinating Production 
 
The data allow an assessment of the factory’s design and use: how its equipment and 
workforce could be most effectively deployed. The first set of machines installed were those 
with the greatest demand. The next set introduced for small blocks could then satisfy the next 
greatest demand. The last set for large blocks was installed to supply the rest of demand. The 
introduction of the machines was rational, delivering the most useful set of machines first.  
The overlaps in machine capacity provided flexibility for manufacturing and can be 
inferred to be a conscious design decision. Both block-making and deadeye machines were very 
expensive and their design and use would reflect real manufacturing needs. Given the heavier 
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demand and workloads on the large and medium sized block machines this flexibility in allowing 
production to shift to less heavily loaded machines was sensible.  
 
Capacity, Staff Workloads and Work Patterns 
 
Cooper (1981-2) analyses the production rates for the machines and concludes that they 
were well-balanced and allowed the close coordination required by a production line. Cooper 
(1984, p. 206) quotes Brunel saying the Mill could make 700 small, 520 medium and 200 large 
blocks daily. She does not recognize this equals 440,000 blocks annually, significantly more than 
the number made or required. Using production rates reveals that meeting demand in 1808 would 
require roughly 155 days’ production of the large blocks required using just the large machines; 
83 days of medium machines’ time and 92 days of the small ones’. None of the machine sets was 
needed full-time throughout the year; but all three together provided a full year’s workload. 
Thus, episodically, each set of machines might have operated continuously as a line, with 
workers shifted between them as a team.  
Thus, each machine set’s capacity was adequate to handle demand; and if, as Cooper 
(1981-2, 1984) and Wilkin (1999) assumed, an individual worker was dedicated to each machine 
then labour would have been underutilized. But, if a single workforce was shifted between 
machine sets as required, labour could then have been fully employed. Management did not 
maximize machine use. Contemporary evidence supports the interpretation that machines were 
not individually manned; but, instead, were used by just four workers moving between them. 
 
FLEXIBLE WORK PATTERNS AND CAPACITY 
 
The Mill was commissioned to make more blocks cheaply and quickly than its outside 
contractors. (Coad, 2005) The critical issue was production capacity and the inability of its 
vendor to easily increase production from off-peak, peace-time levels to the full scale demands 
of war-time. Once the Mill reached full capacity it then appears that the Mill’s management 
adjusted output to match demand by varying staff work patterns.  
For example, Figure 1 shows a workload profile for the first process in making block 
shells: the “conversion” of Elm logs into roughly shaped blocks. It plots a stacked area graph for 
each workman’s earnings throughout 1812; with the highest earner on the lowest strata up to the 
lowest paid  on the top. This shows Mr. Chamberlain was employed regularly through the year 
(with one week off in October) at a constant intensity since the “thickness” of the strata is stable. 
The next best paid worker, Mr. Drew, worked on a similar basis for the first three months while 
Messrs Jolliet and Thorne worked alternate weeks, as may be seen in the “saw-tooth” pattern for 
their earnings: if they worked, it was full time. In mid-year those work patterns for all except Mr. 
Chamberlain were upset; but from mid-July onwards, Messrs Drew, Jolliett and Thorne worked a 
rota with each generally working two weeks on and one week off; again shown as a blunted saw-
tooth pattern in their earnings. Output for most of the year yielded weekly payments of just under 
£5 total. Of particular note is the final six week period in which all four workmen and another 
were fully employed, the Mill then virtually doubled its weekly output compared to the first six 
months’ production. The Mill seems to have regularly underutilized its workers as well as its 
equipment.  
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Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
It may seem odd that staff would work half- or two-thirds time as some did for much of 
the year unless wages were high enough to make such employment attractive. Working practices 
in the Dockyards had previously been flexible as a policy encouraging labour’s loyalty and 
reliability.  Uncertain employment was endemic in the industry and the Mill seems stable by 
comparison. It appears that dockyard workers were more regularly employed at better wages 
under an easier regime than were their civilian counterparts.  
 
Materials Control and Batch Sizing Policies 
 
The Mill did not perform all production processes at the time demand arose—a mixed 
strategy was used sometimes, in which components were made in batches, and the finished block 
assembled only when an order was received. This make-to-stock, assemble-to-order policy was 
appropriate for components such as the pins, coaks and sheaves that could be used in a variety of 
different types and sizes of blocks. The more heavily required and regularly produced items 
seem demand-driven in that the quantities made do not seem to reflect consistent batch sizes 
(recurring identical or multiples of fixed quantities); but that variation may be a consequence of 
variations in process yields or inputs since logs naturally vary in size and have imperfections that 
create uncertain yields.  
These impressions are confirmed by the work-in-progress (WIP) data for 1808 and 1809. 
The descriptions of the WIP items allow their positions in the processing sequence to be 
identified. This implies that a batch ran completely through all of the Brunel machines without 
pause with either one worker moving with it from one machine to the next, or the staff in that 
area working in a “leap-frog” manner. It is also possible that in 1808 when the Mill is said to 
have assigned four workers to these machines that they actually did operate as fully manned 
lines. However, the inherent inefficiencies due to balance delays make that unattractive, and this 
implies that the line did not run as a smooth flow of single units but instead that each machine 
and worker handled batches and the flows were intermittent, though the absence of any WIP 
between the block machines implies that a whole batch was fully processed through all of the 
machines within each day’s work. 
These WIP quantities are divided by the average production rates to show the workloads 
involved. Thus, for example, the 392 small rough shells took an estimated .56 day to make. The 
numbers of batches of small and medium sized blocks in WIP are small, usually fewer than four 
batches for rough blocks, and fewer than six in the sheaving and complete stages. Note that there 
were four workers making block shells and six making sheaves so these batch numbers 
seemingly reflect worker assignments to specific production batches as they progressed through 
the processing.  
For sheaves there are more WIP “pauses” in processing. The implication is that they are 
“buffer stocks” used to insulate each process from variations in their neighbours. (Jacobs and 
Chase, 2013) If one process ran faster than its predecessor it would reduce the WIP built up in 
front of it rather than run out of material. This maximized labour productivity since workers 
could work constantly, with variations in output imposed on these WIP stocks rather than 
affected other worker’s productivity. Although there was a linear flow between these activities 
the pauses signified by these WIP stocks contributed to the Mill’s efficient operation, rather than 
show a loss of control over material flow, or inefficiency in production line design. Variations in 
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production rates would naturally arise when different sized batches of different size sheaves were 
processed making their workloads naturally vary too. These unavoidable differences made 
smooth flows through linked processes impossible. Good management would plan and use WIP 
stocks to accommodate them. Figure 2 illustrates how these processes coordinated output 
between processes over time, although the correlations of weekly output between them were low, 
 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
 
The WIP stocks shown are relatively small, and seem planned to allow each process to 
work independently despite being strongly linked to its neighbours. The first process, the 
converting of lignum vitae logs into blanks processes the greatest number of units. The second 
process, boring and rounding, may be seen to track that almost exactly until mid-July when both 
plateau, representing a near halt in production for both and then production restarts in late 
August through late October when it ceases again until late November. If more staff were used, 
or if the production rate changed the slope of the line showing weekly output would change. Not 
only did these two processes start and stop together, but also the slopes of the lines are similar 
and “parallel”, meaning that their rates of production matched. Differences between them arise 
from a delay in processing materials, shown as a horizontal displacement. The following 
processes are similarly coordinated. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Portsmouth Block Mills were able to satisfy fully the Royal Navy’s requirements for 
blocks and had the capacity to meet any future  requirements. The Mill’s equipment was 
designed to allow different size blocks to be allocated between the machines so that demand 
could most effectively be met, particularly if the most heavily loaded machines’ demands 
increased in the future. The excess capacity of these machines shows that they were not used 
continuously, as Cooper (1981-2, 1984) and Wilkin (1999) supposed; and that even during 1808 
when demand was heaviest staff were moved between them to maximize labour productivity 
rather than machine utilization. In 1812, when production was reduced from its 1808 levels staff 
levels were still kept higher than necessary but reduced the intensity with which they were 
employed through rotating shift patterns or reduced hours. The materials used within the Mill 
seem to be well managed with small batch sizes and low work-in-process stocks. Raw materials 
and finished goods inventories seem rather large, but given the slowness of communications and 
transport that is expected. The Mills were well designed by Brunel and Bentham, and seem to 
have been well managed by Bentham, Goodrich and Burr. Considering modern management 
theory and practice the Mills were effectively designed and well used with staff managed to 
maximize their productivity. 
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FIGURE 1 
Converting Elm Workload Profile 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Sheave Production Processes Cumulative Output 
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